Tackling Urban Challenges: Who should take the Lead?
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You are about to read the 1st issue of the IGLUS Quarterly. IGLUS Quarterly is dedicated to the analysis of Governance, Innovation and Performance in Cities. IGLUS Quarterly is an online quarterly publication aimed at knowledge and experience sharing among scholars and practitioners who are interested in improving the performance of cities, in terms of quality of services, sustainability, resilience and livability.

IGLUS Quarterly’s mission is to provide a medium for the analysis of policies and practices related to the performance of cities. IGLUS Quarterly is neither a news bulletin nor a purely academic journal; rather, it is aimed at bridging the ‘gap’ between practitioners and scholars. To achieve this goal, we have adopted a multidisciplinary perspective, encompassing in particular political, economic, social and technological dimensions which all shape the urban systems. We focus in particular on how governance affects and is affected by the introduction of new technologies, especially the information and communication technologies (ICTs). More broadly, we pay particular attention to innovations in urban systems.

The main input comes from our executive education program on Innovative Governance of Large Urban Systems (IGLUS), which has started its activities as of June 2014. IGLUS takes places in seven cities in North America, Latin America, East Asia, Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East. In each location, we bring together practitioner, scholars, firms and international organizations (such as UN-Habitat and the World Bank) active in various urban infrastructure systems, notable transport, energy, housing, water and others more. From each of these seven training modules the most interesting and relevant contributions are written up as a piece for IGLUS Quarterly. In this way, IGLUS and IGLUS Quarterly empower a global dialogue among urban actors.

May we take this opportunity to invite interested scholars and practitioners, like yourself, to write a short analytical article of 4 to 6 pages for IGLUS Quarterly? IGLUS Quarterly is published at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland. It is openly accessible at www.iglus.org.

In addition, we also kindly invite you to visit the www.iglus.org platform which is aimed to serve as a hub to facilitate the dialogue and networking among scholars, practitioners, firms, NGOs, international organization and other stakeholders interested in shaping the future governance of large urban systems.

January 2015
Matthias Finger - Mohamad Razaghi
About this issue:  
Who should take the Lead in tackling urban challenges;  
Cases from Latin America

This first issue of IGLUS Quarterly is looking at the many actors in the urban governance system who can take the lead when tackling urban challenges. Four initiatives in Latin America, mostly in Mexico, are discussed, all addressing pressing urban challenges. In all of these initiatives several actors could have taken the lead, but it appears that only one did so. Why?

In the first article, David Gomez Alvarez and his colleagues describe the context and process of launching several new metropolitan-level initiatives in Guadalajara, Mexico, the challenges associate with them and the response from the State government to facilitate the coordination challenges.

The second article by José Tores and his colleagues describes the process of city center revitalization, an initiative by Technologico de Monterrey. It is an interesting case to see how a University can take the lead in urban revitalization and contribute to community development, rather than waiting for government.

The third contribution by Cristina Yoshida opens a new perspective on solving urban challenges by way of social entrepreneurs. Social entrepreneurship has attracted attention both among scholars and policy makers in the recent years and is believed to become a strong tool for addressing the many challenges that neither the governments nor big corporations are really motivated and/or capable of acting upon.

The fourth article by Doreen Vorndran describes how establishing a Citizen Observatory on Public Safety and Urban Governance is generating citizen led change in Morelia (one of the cities suffering most from crime in Mexico). There, the government tries to empower the civic community to act as the leader in a public safety initiative that the government has obviously failed to lead it in a successful way.

We hope you will enjoy reading these four articles. We leave the conclusion of “who should take the lead” up to you and invite you to join our discussion. IGLUS Quarterly is an open access analytical bulletin, so we appreciate diverse perspectives in shaping the dialogue and www.iglus.org is the dedicated platform to precisely facilitate such discussions.

Mohamad Razaghi - Matthias Finger
The Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara (MAG) is an urban area located in the State of Jalisco, Mexico. The city is constituted by eight municipalities, in around 2.7 thousand square kilometers with a population of 4,434,878 people (CONAPO, 2010). The core municipality is Guadalajara, giving name to the city, five interior neighboring municipalities being these: El Salto, Tlajomulco, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá and Zapopan; and two exterior municipalities, Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos and Juanacatlán.

The MAG of Guadalajara is the second most important city in the country and it has an influence that goes beyond its boundaries, when we refer to the level of services and goods that are provided by it. The city is the most main generator of income, innovation and development in the state and the region.

During the last decade, Jalisco has faced a variety of changes, regarding urban development, sustainability, resilience and urban planning especially due to the growth of Guadalajara and the municipalities that surround it. These changes claimed to be addressed under an innovative metropolitan approach.

The actions that have to be taken by the municipal governments to provide public services and security are challenging and demand great inter-municipal cooperation. As a response, amongst other things, the State Government has updated its legal framework delivering a Metropolitan Coordination Law, which gave birth to a Metropolitan Coordination System under the form of three coordination entities, with the mandate of providing a better, integrated and more comprehensive solution to the everyday challenges that the city and its inhabitants demand.

However, an efficient metropolitan governance system cannot only rely on the mentioned establishment. Therefore, several other initiatives have been discussed and undertaken in order to strengthen the governmental and collaborative efforts to make the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara a more prosperous and modern city.

The purpose of this article is to briefly describe and analyze the several metropolitan initiatives, the strategic alliances made by the State of Jalisco and the challenges that the Metropolitan Coordination System faced for enhancing the institutional capabilities to better respond to the metropolitan challenges.
all considered as initiatives to achieve the goals set for the special Metropolitan Areas topic in the document.

However, since Mexican law does not contemplate the creation of metropolitan governments, the coordination between the municipalities which create the MAG, have had to face some setbacks. For example, there exists a disconnection between townships and the operating agencies in charge of the provision of public services which is mainly the result of weak coordination mechanisms and an absence of social participation or involvement.

These problems called for urgent and innovative solutions. As a response the state government developed a new Urban Code and the MAG Decree in 2009 and later the Metropolitan Coordination Law which was published in 2011. This law contemplates the existence of three metropolitan coordination entities: the Metropolitan Coordination Board which was established in 2012, the Metropolitan Planning Institute and the Citizen Council, both established in 2014. Such entities are supposed to function as the instruments for policy coordination to address common projects in the MAG, to tackle shared problems and to plan policies oriented on common development goals.

**Metropolitan Coordination Board**
The Metropolitan Coordination Board is made up by the eight mayors of the MAG and the Governor of the State of Jalisco and is responsible for development and implementation of the Metropolitan Agenda, monitoring and implementing the Metropolitan Land Use Plan, the Metropolitan Development Program and future projects, the approval and announcement of selection of members of the Metropolitan Citizens Council, the establishment of the Metropolitan Trust Fund and the approval of the Annual Investment Program for metropolitan projects.

**Metropolitan Planning Institute**
The Metropolitan Planning Institute is aimed at improving the Land Management Plans with a metropolitan approach, as a benchmark within municipalities for the creation of the different municipal development plans. Besides, it is also responsible to develop and implement a metropolitan information system that should work as a support tool in urban decision making process.

**Citizen Council**
The Citizen Council is the entity that holds the citizens voice regarding the metropolitan issues, addressed by the Metropolitan Coordination Board and the Metropolitan Planning Institute.

The MAG coordination as a system faces with several challenges which are the result of the current political, social and economic situation of the city. In addition, the current legal framework is under revision, and fac-

<table>
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<th>Entities objectives</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
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| Metropolitan Coordination Board | - Avoiding partisan disputes among the members and constitutional controversies.  
- Avoiding the supremacy of any member included the Governor and the Mayors.  
- Being able to attend the voices of institutionalized entities and social movements for setting the agenda and its implementation.  
- Decision-making legitimization.  
- Enhancing trust amongst other social movements. |
| Metropolitan Planning Institute | - Gaining space in the public arena.  
- Consolidating its internal organization and procedures to accomplish the main objectives it pursues (values and principles of metropolitan governance) and becoming an effective body.  
- Getting and maintaining political legitimacy creating public value with internal coherence, without putting aside its administrative and operative capacities. |
| Citizen Council | - Legitimate representation of civil society interests, preferences and expectations.  
- Upholding their voice with the other metropolitan coordination entities.  
- Avoiding polarization of views among the members.  
- Getting the recognition of civil society as a legitimate voice and guarantor of their interests against the challenges of the metropolis. |
es the possibility of major changes in order to improve and strengthen the capabilities within the three coordination entities. Nevertheless, each of these three entities has different challenges of their own to justify and legitimize their very own existence. Metropolitan agencies have also serious financial limitations because they do not have enough autonomy or incomes and they depend on central, state or municipal governments.

In the Mexican legal system the obligation of institutions to work together on the implementation of intergovernmental development programs for the benefit of the citizens, is not recognized. Referring especially to those programs in which the conurbations respond to issues which exceed the territorial and jurisdictional limits between the different levels of government. The intergovernmental coordination becomes then, a voluntary agreement between the parts not because of the existing regulations but attending to an existing political willingness.

3. Strategic Alliances of the State of Jalisco: UN HABITAT and World Council on City Data

Due to the fact that the metropolitan coordination legal framework is under revision, UN Habitat will assist the process with public policy recommendations on this regard, seeking to strengthen the current legal and political scenarios for a stronger coordination that will result in the re-construction of a better city, and the improvement of well-being and quality of life for the citizens of MAG.

Additionally, aiming towards the transformation of the MAG into a more prosperous city, the State Government in collaboration with UN-Habitat will provide inputs for the Metropolitan Development Plan (currently being elaborated by the Metropolitan Planning Institute) establishing the main necessary conditions to accomplish the goal of promoting a socially and environmentally sustainable human settlement and achieving a more adequate and inclusive city for all.

Promotion of prosperous cities requires an effective governance mechanism. Realizing such a vision becomes harder under the current metropolitan coordination system mainly because of the difficulties on identifying the problems and defining the way to face them. With the City Prosperity Index (CPI), the Metropolitan Planning Institute will work with clear measures about productivity, environmental sustainability, equity and social inclusion, infrastructure development and quality of life, prioritizing those areas which need more attention and effort and identifying the conditions to carry out actions in an integrated manner.

The institutionalization of metropolitan governance is fundamental for provision of an adequate legal and institutional framework, as well as to ensure the involvement of metropolitan municipalities and their incorporation into governmental programs. To make this happen, UN Habitat will facilitate the Agenda setting to verify the existing gaps between current institutions and those that require a more coordinated, broad, participative, inclusive and effective governance process. On the other hand, verification of implemented policies that actually respond to local public problems and the citizen interests is imperative in order to gain and maintain legitimacy of the metropolitan coordination system.

As part of the efforts for the consolidation of a better metropolitan governance system, MAG through the Undersecretary of Planning and Evaluation of the Government of the State of Jalisco, has accepted an invitation to become a foundation city partner in building the World Council on City Data (WCCD) and to pilot the first ISO approved international standard for city indicators (ISO 37120), coordinated by the Global City Indicators Facility (GCIF) of the University of Toronto. This opportunity, besides being a crucial step for the city, will serve as a valuable input in the completion of the Metropolitan Planning Institute’s mandate to create a metropolitan information system.

To comply with the ISO37120 means to compile a minimum of 46 core indicators out of a total of 100 indicators measuring city services and quality of life, according to standardized definitions and methodologies. With this initiative, the MAG will not only have the chance of building core knowledge for better decision-making, but will also be part of a select group of 17 cities around the world, that will help define the strategic vision of the
WCCD, the drafting of new international standards and to be part of a global hub for learning partnerships and so build a better and more livable city.

Having standardized city indicators can bring MAG a number of benefits that go from achieving a more effective governance and delivery of services, to being an international benchmark and target that will help attract investment due to increased transparency and the existence of an open data platform.

4. Conclusions and discussion

Nowadays the MAG has become a living laboratory on metropolitan solutions. From the governance initiatives to the collaborative strategic alliances, Jalisco is spearheading the search for the best practices towards city prosperity.

Nevertheless, several challenges lay ahead. The Government of the State of Jalisco and MAG should take the lead and embrace these paradigmatic times in order to tackle the myriad of demands of the public, private and non-governmental institutions; seeking the improvement of the quality of life and wellbeing throughout the adequate provision of urban and metropolitan services.

There still lie many obstacles ahead on the road to achieving a perfect metropolitan coordination. The different factors that influence the projects being undertaken by the government do not only present advantages, but are always at risk of failure if not administered properly. Elections are to come for municipality mayors and though today metropolitan coordination is a priority for the current municipal administrations, it may not be so for the upcoming agendas. So, there must be a continued coordination effort from the State Government and the Metropolitan Planning Institute to ensure the efforts are not deluded, and to maintain the visibility of the metropolitan agenda.

In order to achieve the above, the international cooperation provided by UN-HABITAT, may enhance the coordination of the municipalities through the continuous capacity building and strengthening of the commitment adopted by the authorities. Notwithstanding, the international cooperation is not a permanent condition, hence this is a priority for the current administration to ensure that in the forthcoming governments the coordination system and the strategies that arise from this relation become fully institutionalized and adopted.

Regarding the ISO37120 initiative, the compilation of the indicator information has been a great effort, nevertheless the hardest part is yet to come. The monitoring of indicators, made up by eight different municipalities, demand a high level of commitment by the people in charge of the compilation of information and calculations in order to maintain the data updated.

Additionally the available data disparity between the municipalities that form the MAG, mainly due to the different institutional capabilities, presents inherent calculation complications. Furthermore, some of the core and supporting indicators required for the certification are not currently being measured in MAG. This makes it necessary to create and calculate the information within different agencies, which are not articulated and do not share information. The question that remains is how the government will guarantee the continuity of the generation and the periodic actualization of the data in an integrated platform.

With this scenario and agenda, the call of the Government of Jalisco is to sum up efforts and voices of all the different actors in the city, with the aim of keeping up with the urban expansion and social, economical and political development challenges and opportunities. However, this responsibility not only relies on governmental efforts. It is important to recognize that in order to be in the position to adequately address the issues presented by the unendingly changing metropolitan scenario, all the actors must assume themselves as a crucial piece of the metropolitan puzzle.
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1. Introduction: The University and its surrounding areas.

The changing role of the university in our society has been widely studied and discussed in academic literature (see for example Delanty, 2001), yet most of the emphasis has been on the so-called traditional endeavors of higher education institutions, such as research and teaching. According to Goddard and Valence (2013), besides the impact of a university in its community through its research, teaching and public service, a university located in a metropolitan area also has a physical, social, economic and cultural impact on the urban environment.

In recent years, particularly since the 90s, universities have become more active agents in the shaping of the urban space, on the one hand many universities in different countries have been at the center of specific efforts to promote the development of “knowledge cities” (Carrillo, 2006) to support a knowledge-based economy, often based on innovation and high-technology undertakings where the research programs of the universities play a major role. On the other hand, some universities have taken the leadership of urban revitalization programs in their immediate surroundings (see for example, Kromer and Kerman, 2004); these efforts are often associated to large university settings in which the local neighborhoods present a clear decline in their economic, social and physical environment.

This last perspective is at the heart of the Distrito Tec initiative. Under the leadership of the Tecnológico de Monterrey, a private non-for profit nation-wide university in Mexico, the Distrito Tec initiative is a urban revitalization project which embodies an interest in promoting the local development of its neighborhood as well as fostering the launch of a research and innovation cluster and engage the academic community in a learning process to provide Mexico with better alternatives for the sustainability of its cities.

In this paper the focus is centered on one of the primary components of the Distrito Tec initiative: the involvement and engagement of the neighborhood community in this effort.

2. Background and Overview of the Distrito Tec Initiative

Founded in 1943 in Monterrey, Nuevo León, México, the Tecnológico de Monterrey has become a nation-wide educational system with 31 campuses in 27 cities in Mexico, 250,000 alumni, 98,900 currently enrolled students and 9,250 faculty members. The first and the flagship campus of Tecnológico de Monterrey is located in the city of Monterrey.

Monterrey is the capital of the State of Nuevo León in Mexico; it is the center of a wider metropolitan area with a population of 4.1 million people, the third largest in the country. For the last 50 years Monterrey has been one of the most important and dynamic industrial cities in México. After being ranked in 2005 as the safest city in Latin America (America Economía), from 2008...
to 2011 Monterrey was involved in the fights of drug cartels and organized crime, which also affected several regions in México at that time. Monterrey suffered from crimes, extortion, and a general perception of insecurity. National and international media covered intensely the insecurity conditions in Monterrey.

During those years the area of the city where the Monterrey Campus is located was particularly exposed to the insecurity situation. Beginning in 2008 the enrollment of international and out of state students dropped dramatically, the situation in the city and in the area took a big toll on the Monterrey Campus. Fortunately, the situation greatly improved since 2012 due mainly to the active and coordinated participation of the public and private sectors and academic institutions.

In the area around campus, prior to the high insecurity years, certain conditions were created by years of very low public and private investment, a heavy emphasis in student housing, and the Tecnológico de Monterrey’s main attention on its campus conditions. In 10 years, from 2001 to 2010, the population of the 17 neighborhoods (colonias) around campus dropped by 22% (INEGI, 2010). The demographic composition of the area lacks families with children and young professionals; the elderly population (over 64 years old) is over represented compared to the general population of the city (13% vs. 5% in the city) (INEGI, 2010). This became an area with low investment, low population density, vacant infrastructure and a not healthy demographic composition: a very unattractive place to live.

Due to this context, the Tecnológico de Monterrey decided to undertake the initiative to lead a major urban revitalization effort in the area surrounding the Monterrey Campus, the Distrito Tec initiative. A vision of a urban district, at the heart of Monterrey, to become a place that attracts and retains talent, that is a vibrant and diverse community that fosters interaction, creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship in a sustainable environment; an authentic urban ecosystem that offers the conditions for social, economic and community growth.

Three important areas of focus are being addressed as major levers of the Distrito Tec initiative (Figure 1): a) the evolution of the current teaching campus into one that promotes research, innovation, learning and entrepreneurship; b) an emerging research and innovation cluster that will attract talent and create value; c) an urban revitalization process that will create the conditions for an attractive and inspiring urban environment (figure 1).

Since the beginning of its operations the Monterrey Campus has played a major role in the economic and urban development of the Distrito Tec area and there has always been a close tie between the institution and its neighbors. In recent years that relationship has become even stronger as the Tecnológico de Monterrey took an important leadership together with the public authorities in dealing with the insecurity situation of the area. This leadership somehow fostered an already existent passive attitude of the community towards the problems and opportunities of the zone as they relied on the Monterrey Campus to deal with most of these issues. However, in order to promote the urban revitalization initiative of Distrito Tec, and as a main guiding principle of the project, the involvement of the community became a major focus of attention.

Any process of urban change must include the individual and collective engagement of those who live in a defined territory for it to be real and sustainable over time. The specific role and contributions of the community members depend upon their level of commitment and their willingness to actively participate in the improve-
ment of their neighborhood and of their city at large. In this sense, in order to attain community engagement, the first major challenge faced by the project was the general profile of most of the members of the Distrito Tec community; this profile largely corresponds to a pattern often observed in many Mexican communities where there is a lack of civic participation and almost none civil society organizations addressing neighborhood issues in the area.

Based on this situation, the starting point to promote the participation and eventual engagement of the community with the Distrito Tec Initiative was a series of initial surveys and interviews to understand the situation and the level of involvement of the community with neighborhood and local issues. The preliminary results showed a very low level of participation of the community (Table 1):

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not use to meet with their neighbors</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not participate in community events</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not participate in initiatives of betterment or maintenance of the community facilities or infrastructure</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not participate continuously in civic engagement programs</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not participate in civil society organizations</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
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Due to these somehow discouraging figures, the first major objective defined concerning the community involvement was to revert this trend by promoting the creation of formal neighborhood associations in each one of the 17 “colonias” of the Distrito Tec. The process started with a general call to all the members of the community to participate in an initial public meeting in which the broad perspective of the Distrito Tec initiative was presented; individual groups were formed for each “colonia” during this first meeting and the commitment was gained to continue working during several meetings in order to identify the problems that each neighborhood was facing and to define the means to address them.

This process was designed with several goals in view. In one hand faculty members and students were invited to collaborate as facilitators of the meetings and a specific method was proposed to facilitate the discussions and optimize the use of the time constraints. On the other hand, it was important to encourage the participation of the neighbors while lessen the dependency on the role of the Tecnológico de Monterrey as the sole promoter of changes and activities in the Distrito Tec.

To date, after 4 months of collaborative work with the members of the community and the participation of faculty members and students, there are already 9 formal neighborhood committees constituted and the rest are in the process of being constituted. From here on, the idea is to continue the formalization of the rest of the committees and work directly with the chairs of these committees to involve each neighborhood in the Distrito Tec initiative.

The initial steps for getting the involvement and commitment of the neighborhood community in the Distrito Tec Initiative are difficult to summarize highlighting all their relevant aspects; however, in the previous paragraphs an important feature of these initial steps has been advanced, namely the difficulties faced when promoting participation in a new visionary project.

Besides the great amount of effort required to call and actually gain the attendance of the community to the initial meetings and their continuity, there is also the specific challenge of gaining support and commitment to a shared vision of a sustainable future. It is not only a matter of trying to integrate different points of view and different individual values, but it also becomes a matter of promoting education and human development, dealing with a very traditional prevailing urban culture and achieving progress towards a much solid civic participation culture.

4. Conclusions

At this stage of the project it is difficult to draw even early conclusions about what has been achieved and learned so far. Instead, the initial analysis and reflections on the preliminary results help to point out a series of specific questions and issues that need to be addressed, both
from the point of view of the general plan and ongoing activities of the Distrito Tec Initiative, as well as from the point of view of an academic research effort. Three of the main issues identified in this respect are:

• The ethical concerns and actual possibilities of changing the mindset of most of the stakeholders in the neighborhood regarding urban sustainability. For example, the need to challenge traditional values and behaviors associated to mobility (use of private cars vs. other means of transportation), waste disposal and, water and energy consumption habits.

• The threefold role of the university as a direct stakeholder, leading actor and scholar observer of the Distrito Tec Initiative. Within the context of a complex and large university, such as the Tecnológico de Monterrey, the challenges posed by this threefold role imply an important level of internal coordination and organization, as well as a display of institutional attitudes and behavior congruous with the values portrayed by the Distrito Tec initiative.

• A suitable integration of the different groups of stakeholders’ perspectives, contributions and forms of participation. Besides the involvement of the community members addressed in this paper, the Distrito Tec Initiative entails the participation of an important and varied group of stakeholders (the public sector, developers, investors, the Tecnológico de Monterrey community, and so on) that need to be properly and harmoniously orchestrated for this Initiative to be sustainable.

This paper has discussed the initial steps of one of the components of the Distrito Tec Initiative and it represents also the initial attempts to formally analyze and document the process and the results of the project. For all the components, an enormous amount of data and information are being gathered and start to be studied and discussed with the aim of producing knowledge and relevant insights, both for academia and the general public, in order to contribute to the betterment of our communities. As the project unfolds the activities and results of the Distrito Tec Initiative are being shared with the public through the website: http://distritotec.itesm.mx/. All the readers are welcomed to visit this site.

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1. Introduction

Bangladeshi women who traditionally wouldn't have access to any kind of credit have become bank shareholders. Kenyan unbanked people are transferring and withdrawing money through their mobile phones. High quality diabetes treatment at a 70% lower cost for Mexican patients. Brazilian public schools have been using games and technology to customize and assess their students’ education. These are not multilateral organizations projects, philanthropic services, or either innovative public policies (yet!). The Grameen Bank, M-Pesa, Clínicas del Azúcar and Geekie are social enterprises: private companies aiming to solve social problems. What they have in common are the pragmatism and the efficiency from the for-profit world, combined with the sensitivity and engagement typically found in non-profits.

The so-called Impact Investment – focused on social enterprises – is increasingly attracting venture capital. The assets that in 2009 were calculated in around USD 50,000 million by the Monitor Group, were estimated by JPMorgan and GIIN (2011) to reach USD 1 trillion by the end of this decade. The possibilities are endless: turning social problems into business opportunities that produce significant changes in people’s quality of life. If the topic had for some time seen as opportunistic, a number of successful cases where financial profitability and social change go hand by hand have been proving the opposite.

However, entrepreneurs who engage in market solutions to our social problems still find it very difficult to access this capital. Most of them are in a growth phase of their companies when they are too old to grow with the help from family and friends and even seed capital, and are considered too early-stage and risky for a more robust investment.

2. The Pioneer Gap: barriers for social entrepreneurs

Many of the social entrepreneurship initiatives are creating markets that were never approached by private initiative before. Some of the challenges that these entrepreneurs face to grow and gain scale are the lack of basic infrastructure – especially those working in areas without electricity, roads or internet, for example. There are also limited possibilities for their customers to pay for their products and services, even when these are low-cost ones; after all, these entrepreneurship initiatives are supposed to solve social problems, and not create more problems and debts. Other challenges are to attract experienced and talented managers, the absence of supply chains (those who want to provide healthy and organic products not always know who can supply them) and distribution (the case of a great product for rural population which is not reaching its target). The pioneers are the ones who usually suffer the most from such challenges.

One of the most illustrative examples of the journey of a pioneer is the microcredit case. When Muhammad Yunus established the Grameen Bank in 1976, it seemed unreasonable for traditional banks to approach such
low-income customers with no guarantees. By that time, banks wouldn't give credit to women, no matter their socio-economic background. His initiative became a private company in only about 10 years after he started to give loans because no one in the sector would believe in his business model. In 2006 he received the Nobel Peace Prize and today, almost 40 years later, he is finally able to watch the development of a whole important industry for the benefit of hundreds of millions of people worldwide. Today, his bank provides more than 100 million USD unsecured loans a month, with a non-performing loan ratio of about 2%. Out of its 8 million borrowers, 97% are women. But, the question is whether there is a way to reduce such huge gaps for pioneer social entrepreneurs?

3. Bridging the Pioneer Gap: the role of impact investors & accelerators

The early stage of social enterprises and its funding barriers are the main topic of an article published in 2012 by representatives of Monitor Group and Acumen. Acumen is a leading impact investment manager that have invested $83 million in 75 social enterprises in 13 years. A combination of founder’s money, strategic grants, public subsidies, impact-focused investments and other creative ways to attract different types of capital for specific goals at different growth stages were found as key success factors in Acumen’s portfolio. Investment funds with moderate financial return targets – such as 5% per year or lower – remain as the clearest solution for bridging the gap between early-stage social entrepreneurs and investors.

However, how long will it take for sectors such as water, energy, sanitation, agriculture, health, housing and education to be proven as good business opportunities with high social impact for more investors?

Micro-insurance protects the poor against risks such as accidents, illness, death in the family, and natural disasters through payments tailored to their needs, income and level of risk. It is aimed primarily at low-income workers in the informal economy, which tend not to be served by the main commercial schemes and social security. Leapfrog Investments is an example of an investor who took the risk and decided to focus on mid-market in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, India and the Philippines, and finally led a trend. In 2005, only 7 out of the 50 largest insurance companies in the world offered microinsurance; now they are 33 in total. These companies have realized that it is the direction in which they can grow. It was a push to activate a latent market.

But there are more ways to bridge the Pioneer Gap rather than through money. One of the interesting materials that resulted from this debate is a study by Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) and Village Capital called “Bridging the Pioneer Gap: The Role of Accelerators in Launching High-Impact Enterprises”. The publication reinforces the role of incubators and accelerators in the emergence and growth of social business. These organizations support early-stage social enterprises by providing services such as business skills development, mentoring, infrastructure, networks and other resources. 52 impact accelerators from across the globe were part of this study, most of them founded during the past five years. Thus, there is very little research on their role and performance, especially in emergent economies, which makes it harder to define what exactly their impact on social enterprises is.

4. Beyond the Pioneer: the fundamental participation of governments, multilateral institutions and other ecosystem developers

In April 2014, Monitor Inclusive Markets launched a new report called “Beyond the Pioneer: Getting inclusive industries to scale”. This study starts from an analysis of 439 promising companies in Africa, where only 13% of them had begun to scale significantly.

Reaching scale is fundamental for investors. The logic is that billions of people around the world live in poverty and suffer its consequences. Scaling up social business would not only touch more lives, but also contribute to its viability, once most of this kind of business have low margins at a small scale.

The new approach, therefore, is going beyond a single
social enterprise point-of-view. It is understood that the barriers that prevent these companies to grow are embedded in their environments: non-conscious consumers, farmers who are unaware of techniques and benefits of sustainable planting, distribution channels that need to be created from zero, and the costly regulation to be simplified. Thus, the focus shifts from building specific businesses to build an entire industry, with suggested roles for philanthropic foundations, multilateral institutions, nonprofits, impact investors, governments and companies.

Figure 1: Scaling Barriers for an early-stage social enterprise

The ‘mobile money’ case in Africa is an example of a strategic investment that was important to help developing a whole sector, and not only a single company. M-Pesa is a service that allows anyone with a mobile phone to transfer money securely through the mobile network, saving time and money for unbanked people who need to send, receive or withdraw money. M-Pesa was already a 2-year successful business in Kenya when Vodafone decided to expand it to neighboring Tanzania. Nevertheless, after 14 months of operations, results were disappointing: the service had only signed up 280,000 users and 930 agents. In Kenya, by the same 14 months of operations, M-Pesa had already 2.7 million users and 3,000 agents.

A set of factors contributed to this frustrating start. Vodacom, the local Vodafone affiliate in Tanzania had lower market share: 41%, compared to Safaricom’s 79% in Kenya. Vodacom also had significantly less ‘super agents’ – only 5, while in Kenya there was 1,000. That was critical not only to persuade local dealers, but especially for a handholding service so new customers feel more confident to make significant transactions.

However, the most significant barriers were outside the company. Tanzania had a lower level of rural bank branch penetration, which forced M-Pesa agents – usually small shops owners – to hold substantial amounts of money to attend their client’s needs. Also, in Tanzania people were taking much longer to understand what mobile money would do for them. Since people culturally valued the ritual of giving gifts and money in person, it didn’t make sense to have an intermediary. Financial literacy was also lower.

Vodacom could invest on training their agents, but this wouldn’t be so significant for its brand, since dealers offered similar services from different network operators, as well as customers were not loyal to specific brands – they usually had dual or triple-SIM phones. That was much different from the Safaricom reality in Kenya, where relationships with dealers were exclusive. In Tanzania, other market players were also preparing to enter the mobile money market so the probability of having competitors free riding on anyone else’s investment was high.

In early 2010, Vodacom began to engage the ‘aggregators’, a new type of channel intermediaries that would support and train local agents. They also changed their marketing approach to a more educational campaign. All this led to a turnaround at the company, and was possible thanks to a $ 4.8 million grant provided by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to Vodacom. The
Foundation was already in negotiations with the Bank of Tanzania for conducive regulations and policies, but concerned with the general discouragement of players to provide mobile money. Although the grant was made to Vodacom, the Foundation has made it clear that its intention was to accelerate the whole industry rather than to create an advantage for a single operator. The Bank of Tanzania also had an important role on understanding the barriers and working on comprehensive policies not only for mobile money but for the whole financial inclusion scenario.

According to the Monitor Inclusive Markets, mobile in Tanzania has boomed since then, with the number of active users and transaction volumes growing from 170,000 people and $202 million in 2009, to over 9 million people and $4 billion in 2013. The mobile money penetration is now not only higher among mobile subscriber base in Tanzania than it is in Kenya, but also two-thirds cheaper, due to the competitive environment.

![Figure 2: Scaling barriers for mobile money in Tanzania](image)


5. Tackling the challenges and empowering more social entrepreneurs

Social enterprises can have a key role in development, complementing initiatives from government, multilateral institutions, philanthropic foundations, civil society organizations, among others. Unfortunately, just a few representatives of each of these actors already include the support to social entrepreneurship in their strategies.

Large urban systems, especially in emergent economies, face complex challenges that are transversal to housing, mobility, security, water, waste, energy, poverty and other issues. Along with the examples mentioned all over this article, it is possible to find many more interesting cases in each one of these topics. Actually, urban development issues are one of the main focus of impact investors across the globe.

We can’t expect social enterprises themselves to deliver a systemic change to all these issues, but it is fundamental to include their work in the strategies, where public policies, corporate initiatives, multilateral organizations and foundations programs and others play complementary roles. Thus, it is very important to recognize and understand each one’s role in this ecosystem, and how each actor can contribute to a collaborative environment where social entrepreneurs feel encouraged to develop their ideas and grow their businesses.

To make sure that social entrepreneurship will be a strategic asset in your city development, it is important to go through the checklist below:

1. Identifying the needs of social entrepreneurs

First of all, it is important to recognize the work of those who are already engaged on social entrepreneurship in your city. Entrepreneurs communities, virtual platforms, professional networking meetings and local incubators and accelerators portfolios can be a good start to identify who are the current (and future) social entrepreneurs, what they are doing and what they need for taking their next step.

2. Understanding the ecosystem

Identifying who else is engaged in supporting social entrepreneurship is relevant to make efforts efficient, and not waste resources. The point here is to understand what government, regulation bodies, corporates, academia, incubators, accelerators, investors, NGOs, awards and...
competitions organizers, media professionals, think tanks, research centers, service providers, customers and other actors are doing to facilitate (or hamper) the work of social entrepreneurs.

3. Comparing your reality to global references

The local challenge is to encourage new social entrepreneurs? Is it improving some good ideas so they can be validated? Is it growing existing businesses? The promotion and support to social entrepreneurship is something relatively recent in the whole world. Thus, there are no recipes but good references of success and failure. According to your local reality, there will be many inputs from other contexts that will be useful to define local strategies.

4. Putting your hands on

Based on the local needs’ findings, and comparing it to global references (such as the reports mentioned before in this article), it is time to define roles and actions plans for short, medium and long terms. Having ambitious goals doesn’t prevent to start with apparent small actions – one lesson from working with social entrepreneurs is the importance of starting doing now. Having a committee or any kind of group that make decisions together is also a way of creating common sense and developing a whole ecosystem, and diminishing the risk of having a single actor trying to convince everyone else of something that doesn’t make sense for all.

Monitor Inclusive Markets’ 2014 report presents a list of recommendations for foundations, aid donors, mission-driven intermediaries, multilateral development agencies, impact investors, governments and companies to solve social enterprises’ scaling barriers. But these are just a few of many actors that can perform a determinant role in accelerating the creating and growth of social enterprises. The more integrated these actors are, their capability of identifying main barriers and acting for overcoming them are stronger. And that can be a key factor to lead to systemic changes.

References


1. Introduction

Since the beginning of year 2014, the federal state of Michoacán in Mexico has been in the international headlines. Especially after Klaus Schwab, the current president of the World Economic Forum, asked President Enrique Peña Nieto on how the Mexican state will deal with these rising self-defense groups in Michoacán. At that time armed vigilante groups were present in at least 30 of the 112 municipalities of the state of Michoacán claiming to liberate them from organized crime. In response to their continuous spread the federal government appointed a special commission headed by Alfredo Castillo Cervantes which has been coordinating police operations and social and economic programs in order to re-establish peace and security and promote economic and social progress in Michoacán. Since then the Commission on Security and Development has co-governed the state along with the Governor of Michoacán. No end is in sight.

Once again Michoacán received international attention during 2014 when videos - published by the organized crime – revealed the dimension of the “narco state”. For more than three administrations leaders of Michoacán’s political elite have been under the influence of the leading criminal group “The Temple Knights”.

In the meantime the atrocities of executions, kidnappings and forced disappearances of persons continue. According to the criminal statistics of the Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants has been growing annually about 7.6% in average since 2006.

2. Crime and violence in Morelia

The city of Morelia -the capital of the state of Michoacán- shares the problems of crime and violence. In 2013, 27.3 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants were registered by the local authority, although the city apparently is not the most violent place in Michoacán. As figure 1 indicates, there has been a significant increase of intentional as well as unintentional homicide over the past three years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intentional homicide</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional homicide</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total homicide</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With regard to other incidences of violence and crime, kidnapping and extortion -which are usually related to organized crime- show the highest growth rates (Figure 2). According to a research conducted by Seguridad, Justicia y Paz. Consejo Ciudadano de Seguridad Pública y Justicia Penal in 2012, which compared the crime statistics of 212 municipalities, Morelia occupied rank 4 in extortion with 20.7 extortions per 100,000 inhabitants. In 2013 Morelia occupied rank 5 with 12 kidnappings per 100,000 inhabitants (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz 2013).

The institutional response to this situation which has...
been unfolding in Morelia over the past 10 years has been weak. In the city there are 0.4 police officers for every 1000 inhabitants while international guidelines recommend 2 (Morelia Como Vamos, 2014). About 71 agents of the Ministerio Público (Office of the Public Prosecutor) are in charge to receive and investigate crime reports made by citizens. In 2013 those agents attended 13,662 reports which represent 7.4% of the estimated crime related incidents. According to estimations of Morelia Como Vamos, the local Citizen Observatory on Crime and Urban Governance, about 92.6% of the crime incidents were not reported or investigated by the authority. In other words, there is not sufficient institutional capacity to do justice. It was calculated that the impunity level reached 99.2% in 2010 (Morelia Como Vamos 2014).

Along with the public safety crisis, Morelia has faced challenges in urban governance and economic development. Between 1975 until 2000 the surface of the city has been growing 91.6% (Alvarez 2011). The population has been doubled from 353,055 in 1980 to 729,279 in 2010 (INEGI 1980, 2010). This has created social and economic pressure on the city. Since 2002 Morelia has suffered a severe economic downturn which has impacted in employment opportunities and the business community. The unemployment rate increased from 4.2% (2005) to 5.45% (2013) (Morelia Como Vamos 2014). The total value added crashed from 29 billion pesos in 2003 to 14.22 billion pesos in 2011.

### 3. Creation of Morelia Como Vamos - the Citizen Observatory on Public Safety and Urban Governance

The principle concern expressed by citizens interested in participating in this initiative was related to the safety of their own person and their family. They worried to be exposed to the media, questionable politicians, and corrupt police forces which then may use the personal information to extort and kidnap or look for any other kind of harm in order to constrain the functioning of the Observatory.

A second obstacle was associated with the comprehension of data and the subject of crime and crime prevention. The great majority of interested citizens were illiterate in understanding and interpreting statistical information. It was their first time to engage in debates based on facts and concepts such as crime, crime prevention etc. The same phenomenon was observed among the local public servants who also showed resistance to provide access to reliable and objective data. These two aspects – lack of statistical and conceptual comprehension and limited access to information – would determine later on the functioning of the Citizen Observatory according to its set goals.

Figure 2: Growth of crime and violence in Morelia (2000, 2006, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime reported to the authority</td>
<td>8,376</td>
<td>12,076</td>
<td>13,662</td>
<td>+63.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery and theft</td>
<td>3,468</td>
<td>6,634</td>
<td>7,910</td>
<td>+128.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>-14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional homicide</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>+503.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>+240.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>+464.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated with data of Morelia Como Vamos (2014)
society of Morelia as it would be expected in a project of citizen participation. The creation and the consolidation of the Citizen Observatory on Public Safety and Urban Governance formed part of the federal program “Subsidios para la Seguridad en los Municipios (SUBSEMUN)” which also included conducting an assessment of local factors of crime and violence, setting up a crime prevention plan, establishing a Citizen Council on Public Safety and training local public servants and police on issues of crime and crime prevention as well as community policing besides initiating community based crime prevention programs, building the capacity of the local police force in terms of training, equipment and infrastructure. In 2012, the city of Morelia participated for the first time in this program. Once the funding was received, all the previously mentioned components of the SUBSEMUN started to be implemented; among them – the Citizen Observatory on Public Safety and Urban Crime.

The funding of the crime prevention programs was directly assigned to the municipal public administration in charge of the subcontracting. It was not unusual that service providers were asked quotas in order to obtain the contract(s) or that new legal entities with the direct or indirect participation of local public servants were founded in order to access and divert these federal funds. The combination of a government initiated citizen participation project and the direct access of a great amount of federal funds contributed to politicize further the public safety issue in Morelia.

4. Strategies towards a meaningful citizen participation in public safety and urban crime

In order to achieve a meaningful citizen engagement with certain degree of autonomy from local decision makers in the public administration equipped with facts, concepts and tools to monitor and analyze the public safety and urban governance situation and public policies in Morelia, five key strategies were developed and applied by the Tecnológico de Monterrey, a national private university with one of its campus in Morelia, Michoacán, who was in charge of the creation of the Citizen Observatory. The approaches also aimed to attend the concerns and obstacles that surrounded the creation of the Citizen Observatory.

Strategy 1: It was necessary to increase the awareness and to inform the entrepreneurial, social, academic and moral leaders of Morelia about the situation in Morelia with concrete facts and figures. Individual interviews and face to face meetings were conducted to build a relationship with those leaders. But also a questionnaire was sent out to find out what was their attitude related to the situation and their possible commitment. Surprisingly 62.5% of the contestants were optimistic about the future of the Morelia and the great majority had very clear idea on how they would like to participate to improve the situation in Morelia (Tecnológico de Monterrey 2013). In order to conclude this strategy a general meeting was held to create the interim body that would lead to the Citizen Observatory. A total of 40 leaders committed themselves to participate in this process.

Strategy 2: Facilitated by the Tecnológico de Monterrey, the citizens interested in a long term participation formed an interim governing body which determined the organization, the legal constitution and the actual operation of the Observatory. Working groups were set up which developed during a period of two months and the proposals were eventually voted upon in the constitutional General Assembly of the Observatory. It was agreed that the key operational principle of the Observatory is to act as a group, avoiding individual protagonist behavior. A total of 3 working groups were operational and 20 leaders continued their participation in this process.

Strategy 3: It was for the very first time that Morelia would have an Observatory. In order to comprehend its goals and functioning, the interested citizens were provided with facts and figures about the methodology of Urban Observatory of the United Nations but also about public policies on urban development, public safety and crime prevention in Morelia. The members also received training in crime data analysis, concepts and approaches of crime prevention and the design of public policies and programs.
Strategy 4: In order to facilitate the reporting and monitoring of crime and urban governance issues, the Tecnológico de Monterrey created the very first online information system which has been made available to each and every citizen of Morelia under www.moreali-comovamos.org. It projects and visualizes key data on crime and urban governance of the past 15 years. This has enabled citizens as well as public servants to access information in an easy and comprehensive way and integrate it into the decision making on public policies. At the moment the Observatory monitors 33 indicators which are classified into manifestation, generation and attention to problems of crime and urban governance. The information system includes the functionality of georeferentiation. For the first time criminal and violent events in the municipality are put into a map which is available to the inhabitants of Morelia.

Strategy 5: To access more data about public safety and urban governance, the members of the Observatory have established a direct dialogue with the local security and other governmental institutions. One of its first achievements was an agreement with the local police which established concrete goals for crime reduction in Morelia within the next months.

5. New spaces for empowered citizen participation in urban governance

The results of those strategies are promising. A group of 11 citizens representing organizations from different sectors of the Morelian community have committed to the Citizen Observatory and have maintained it operating until today. Thanks to its persistence it succeed to open its offices in May 2014 with personnel who supports the daily operations. Supported by the Tecnológico de Monterrey it conducted the first victimization survey of the city of Morelia and designed a community intervention which aims to tackle the problem of illegal roadblocks set up by neighbors in protection against the harms of the increasing crime and violence in their suburbs. Its information system has been accepted by the community; citizens as well as public servants access it frequently to be informed about the recent developments in Morelia. Recently, the Citizen Observatory has begun to monitor local media with regard to crime and violence related news.

In conclusion, although the creation of the Citizen Observatory was not an easy going, straight forward process, it was a necessary and important decision for the governance of the city of Morelia. Its major contribution until today has been in making the crime and urban governance situation more transparent to the population but also to the local government thanks to its information system. Laying the foundation of such a process as democratic and participatory as possible was many times challenged by the lack of understanding, skills and experiences of such democratic participation as well as by interests in economic resources. However, new spaces for empowered citizen participation in urban governance were opened, even though governmental key actors have been striving -with more or less success- to control them.
References:


